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Introduction
This paper describes options for cyber deterrence to address both asymmetric threats from terrorists and the intimidation associated with nation-state peer competitors in the cyber domain. It presents recent National Security Strategy interests and demonstrates a lack of focus upon cyber infrastructure. The paper will examine challenges associated with legal aspects in the cyber domain as well as the issue of attribution. It will analyze terrorist and nation-state usage of cyberspace and potential threats aimed at the United States related to each. Finally, the paper concludes with several recommendations for tailored cyber deterrence focused on terrorists and peer nation-states.
The idea of deterrence has existed since the beginning of humanity. Lawrence Freedman in his book Deterrence uses the biblical tale of Adam, Eve, and the forbidden fruit as an example of deterrence. 2 Webster defines deterrence as "maintenance of military power for the purpose of discouraging attack." 3 The threat of war has always been a tool used by leaders to influence foreign powers to avoid acts of aggression. Ultimately, deterrence became synonymous with American Cold War strategic thinking and foreign policy.
Mutually assured destruction was a classic adoption of deterrence through punishment.
However, deterrence through punishment requires the demonstration of offensive capabilities.
The highly classified nature of the United States cyber-based offensive tools makes this approach unlikely. In addition, deterrence by punishment does not work without identification and attribution. Lastly, any assumption of rationality demonstrates the fallacy of Cold War deterrence applied to the cyber domain.
Today's multi-polar world provides multiple threats aimed at the United States in the cyber domain. From cyber terrorists to sophisticated nation-states, adversaries are increasing their cyber capabilities on a daily basis. Some argue for an offensive cyber doctrine of preemption, but as demonstrated in Iraq, preemption can be destabilizing. Acts of war may justify an offensive response, but conventional or nuclear deterrence is more appropriate when attempting to deter aggression defined by war. Complicating cyberspace deterrence is the lack of attribution, no traditional constraints associated with rational behavior of extremists, and a deficient United States cyber national strategy.
The next chapter of this paper reviews recent United States strategies and critical cyber infrastructure, attribution in the cyber domain, and cyber espionage. Chapter three provides analysis of cyber terrorism and nation-state operations in the cyber domain. Chapter four describes cyber deterrence recommendations aimed at countering terrorists as well as United
States peer competitors. The final chapter presents conclusions.
Technologies to attribute actions within the cyber domain are essential if any type of deterrence strategy is to be effective. 4
Chapter 2
Background National Security Strategy and Critical Infrastructure
The 2002 United States National Security Strategy (NSS) states, "traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents." 5 Four years later, the 2006 NSS states, "The new strategic environment requires new approaches to deterrence and defense." 6 The current NSS focuses on several "essential tasks" to meet America's national security challenges. 7 Its aim is to promote democracies, prevent terrorist attacks, and support global economic growth. The NSS hardly mentions cyber security, cyber infrastructure, nor does it consider cyberspace a vital national interest.
The United States has become increasingly reliant upon the global cyber infrastructure.
The 2006 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) states, "protecting the critical infrastructure and key resources of the United States is essential to the Nation's security." It goes on to state, "direct terrorist attacks and natural, man-made, or technological hazards could produce catastrophic losses in terms of human casualties, property destruction, and economic effects." 8 A critical piece of many commercial networks is the command and control system called Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition or SCADA. SCADA systems manage critical infrastructure tasks in support of many industrial processes such as energy production, pressure and flow in pipelines, control of transportation systems, and others.
9
The NIPP mentions SCADA seven times over 196 pages, but does very little to identify those SCADA systems that would result in national level consequences should a compromise occur. The NIPP does mention the National Asset Data Base (NADB), but this system seems to be of limited value when making decisions concerning national security policy. The NADB contains information on over 77,000 individual assets, ranging from nuclear power plants to petting zoos. 10 The presence of a large number of entries generally associated with the latter and having little national relevance has resulted in criticism from the United States Congress.
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Equally disturbing is the NADB data submissions are all voluntary.
Security for SCADA is typically five to ten years behind corporate information management systems because of its historically isolated stovepipe structure. 12 Traditionally, computer security activities have focused on the "enterprise" side of the network while paying little attention to the parallel networks associated with SCADA systems. As more and more SCADA systems migrate away from their proprietary protocols running on physically separated networks, the associated process control data migrates to business networks and the Internet.
Recent events in the summer of 2008 demonstrate nuclear power plant networks may be vulnerable to cyber-based incidents. At a nuclear power plant in Georgia, a software update and subsequent reboot to a computer operating on the plants business network resulted in plant shutdown. 13 A more serious incident occurred at an inactive nuclear power plant in Ohio were computers became infected by the Slammer worm in January 2003. 14 The worm entered the plant through an unsecure contractor network that bypassed the plant's firewall. 15 Plant engineers had failed to install a 6-month old Microsoft patch.
Each of these incidents demonstrates the increasing connectivity between SCADA systems and corporate business networks resulting in SCADA access from the Internet. This should be of concern to security professionals entrusted with maintaining these systems due to a changing threat environment. 16 These numbers continue to climb as more companies see security breaches originate from Internet connected sources.
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Vulnerabilities do exist in America's energy infrastructure, and as more SCADA networks connect to the Internet and more applications rely on Microsoft products, these vulnerabilities may increase rather than decrease. National strategy to address these changes in critical infrastructure and the associated threat is significantly lacking in United States security strategy documents. The most disturbing scenario some envision is the possibility of a parallel strategy using cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure in conjunction with physical attacks. 18 However, without attribution in the cyber domain, linking a cyber-attack to a terrorist group or government is difficult at best.
The Problem of Attribution
A critical requirement for effective cyber deterrence is the concept of attribution. The
United States Air Force defines attribution as "the process by which one can ascribe an attack to a particular person or organization." 19 Computer operations traversing the Internet are inherently anonymous because the underlying infrastructure and protocols do not support attribution. As a result, identifying the source of a cyber-attack is nearly impossible when an attacker uses the common techniques associated with many of today's distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks. DDoS attacks typically involve an assailant using a compromised computer to launch attacks against and through other machines across a network. 20 Packet trace-back techniques offer one possible solution to identify the source of an attack through one or multiple networks.
Some network equipment manufacturers such as Cisco are now offering software tools that will trace traffic from a denial of service attack back to its source.
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Other tools and methods that attempt to provide a level of attribution include Ingress filtering. This method requires all message traffic entering a network to have a valid Internet Protocol (IP) source address belonging to the known set of IP addresses in the originating network. 22 Obviously, this method would significantly decrease IP address spoofing, provided it were implemented by a majority of the world's Internet service providers (ISP). Still other tools include honeypots and honeytokens. A honeypot is a decoy system, while a honeytoken is decoy information. The problem with each of these examples is that they are unable to distinguish between malicious attackers and unknowing compromised users.
There is a significant difference between identifying a cyber-attack source, and linking the attack to a human or government. Cyber-attackers ensure their anonymity by utilizing IP spoofing, media access control spoofing, or employment of large botnet armies. Botnets consist of hundreds or thousands of compromised computers routinely used to accomplish DDoS attacks or harvest information. 23 Attribution in this environment will be difficult to accomplish.
Privacy and Attribution
The notion of attribution conflicts with many current privacy policies due to the information required for successful attribution can be very sensitive and requires protection against unauthorized access. was illegal for law enforcement agents to identify a hacker who had illegally penetrated a government computer, as well as most domestic computer systems, without first obtaining consent or a court order. 26 The Patriot Act implemented two important changes:
-Established a new exception for intercepting communications of "computer trespassers,"
-Directed sharing of information between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 27 The Patriot Act goes on to define a computer trespasser as "a person who accesses a protected computer without authorization and thus, has no reasonable expectation of privacy in any communication transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer." Federal initiatives provide important tools that protect both the cyber domain and personal privacy; however, the task of attributing unauthorized cyber activity and ultimately deterring unwanted cyber behavior will continue to require additional research. Also important will be updates to future domestic and international law.
Espionage versus Cyber-attack
It is important to distinguish between cyber espionage and cyber-attacks. Espionage is traditionally thought of as spying, a very different concept when compared to the use of force.
The United Nations (UN) Charter of 1945 makes an important distinction between espionage and use of force.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter places certain prohibitions on the use of force and states, "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." 31 As a result, there has been a long-standing acceptance of espionage as a legitimate action under Article 2(4). However, this
Charter was drafted at a time when major wars, to include nuclear war, were perceived as the most probable conflicts of the time. In the cyber domain, an act of espionage can be committed from outside the nation-state victim, making prosecution reliant on extradition. However, under international law, there is no right to extradition, 32 and therefore, no nation is likely to extradite an agent who commits cyber espionage. 33 Today, the UN Charter has trouble adjusting to an era of terrorists and nation-states conducting operations in the cyber domain.
The difference between cyber espionage and cyber-attack is important because cyber espionage provides an opportunity for successful, repetitive intelligence gathering, through the manipulation of software. During cyber espionage, an agent may leave a trap door behind resulting in countless acts of espionage, a far different incident when compared to traditional physical espionage. 34 International law permits cyber espionage in much the same way as traditional espionage; however, it is typically a crime under domestic law.
Destruction with real world physical results defines cyber-attack. 35 Scope, intensity, and duration identify the significance of a cyber-attack. 36 However, most cyber-attacks seen to date do not rise to a level that allows for use of force as defined by the UN Charter. Perhaps deterrence of cyber-attacks and cyber espionage is possible with a strong network defense strategy, in much the same way physical security barriers may deter physical attacks and traditional espionage. This makes sense as the international community attempts to define appropriate legal measures to address the cyber domain.
There are no easy answers. Cities ranked cyber terrorism as a top "fear" for the majority of city officials. 39 Recent research suggests there are upwards of 5,600 web sites that promote al-Qaeda ideology and this number is growing by 900 new sites every year. 40 However, real cyber-attacks that result in death and mayhem remain the rhetoric of alarmists and profiteers.
Terrorist Tactics and the Internet
A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report states, "terrorist adversaries of Internet usage on the rise in the Middle East, and terrorists operating freely in the cyber domain, American cyber deterrence strategy should focus on terrorist activities and values.
Terrorism is not about terror. However, terrorists use the global information infrastructure in many ways to support their ideological ends. Terrorists find Internet usage attractive because it is cheaper, more anonymous, offers more targets, and provides the ability to reach a larger number of people. 45 The terrorist center of gravity (COG) is their popular support both in the local and international populations. The Internet is the medium used by terrorists to reach their COG. Because the terrorist COG resides in the cyber domain, it is here that deterrence must operate.
Terrorists hold a decided edge in the information domain. Terrorists use the Internet for propaganda dissemination, recruitment, communications, fund raising, and operational execution. 46 Terrorists routinely present their propaganda to supporters in the local language with detailed information concerning their cause and activities. They will target the international public through press releases and historical background information in a variety of languages.
Engagement of terrorists through the cyber domain is required if local populations around the world are to renounce violence and embrace the legitimacy of counterterrorism efforts. At the opposite end of the threat spectrum is cyber usage by peer competitors of the United States.
Nation State Peer Competitors
Nations such as China and Russia seek to improve their ability to operate in the cyber domain for a variety of reasons to include exploitation of the United States information infrastructure, potential disruption or destruction of information infrastructures during some future conflict, and for intelligence collection. 47 The range of threats includes malware, phishing exploits, network penetrations, and botnets to name just a few. Research has shown many of the recent cyber-attacks that trace back to China in fact originated within the Red Hacker Alliance. Its membership has grown from a few thousand to over 300,000, mostly young male nationalists. 49 China denies any relationship with the Red
Hacker Alliance, claiming Chinese law forbids attacks using the Internet. 50 Denying association while tolerating Red Hacker Alliance operations provides China with plausible deniability. 51 It is doubtful the Chinese government actually accounts for so many cyber-attacks as the PLA would not be so injudicious as to attempt intrusions from easily indefinable government accounts. 52 One possibility is that a lack of computer systems security updates and heavy reliance on pirated software has resulted in China becoming a haven for botnet command and control sites (C2). 53 In either case, the existence of the Red Hacker Alliance demonstrates a significant expansion of Chinese civilian actions focused on cyber-attack and cyber operations. The main similarity between Russian and Chinese cyber warfare programs appears to be an offensive doctrine emphasizing a "first strike" mentality. 60 Russian cyber doctrine states, "enemy access to external information should be denied, credit and monetary circulation should be disrupted, and the populace should be subjected to a massive psychological operation--including disinformation and propaganda." 61 This doctrine appears to be inline with the cyberattacks against Georgia.
Given China's focus on information warfare, and even the remote possibility of Russia's coordinated cyber-attacks against Georgia, United States efforts to deter foreign preparation for these types of parallel attacks against American national interests would be appropriate. As mentioned before, terrorists use the Internet for propaganda, recruitment, communications, fund raising, and operational execution. Deterrence of terrorist activities such as propaganda distribution and recruitment requires a robust cyber-based virtual diplomacy effort. This is no trivial task in the international arena. It will require close cooperation across the United States interagency process to ensure the translation of communications into influence through a thorough understanding of language, culture, and values of the target audience. 63 An important first step in countering terrorist propaganda and recruitment efforts would be the creation of regional strategic communications plans. The difficulty for American efforts to embrace these initiatives as deterrence options is the possibility of tainting the message through an appearance of American sponsorship.
The United States has made efforts to improve its image throughout the Middle East by supporting regional broadcasters to include Radio Sawa and Al-Hurrah satellite television;
however, garnering support from the mainstream Muslim world is the key requirement. 71 The communications goal should be to discredit violent extremism. This message gains credence when content and media distribution occur from within the local indigenous population. Islamic scholars and clerics are highly influential and as such, the United States should promote those who reject violence and terrorist acts. 72 Reformed terrorists offer an additional source for communicating an anti-extremist message. 73 Celebrity figures who promote mainstream messages of peace can influence the local population provided there is a strong celebrity following in the target community. 74 The goal in each example is to provide a mainstream voice to the anti-extremism message. Successfully discrediting violent extremism may also dissuade local populations from providing financial support to terrorist organizations.
Terrorists use the Internet to raise funds by encouraging believers to make on-line donations. Typically, a terrorist web site will provide banking information and account numbers for direct deposit of donations. 75 Some web sites even provide information for credit card gestures. 81 The model could provide a critical tool to deter terrorist usage of the Internet in planning and executing extremist attacks.
Peer Competitors and Cyber Deterrence
The 2006 NSS states East and Southeast Asia's "stability and prosperity depend on our sustained engagement: maintaining robust partnerships supported by a forward defense posture supporting economic integration through expanded trade while promoting democracy and human rights." 82 It goes on to state, "The United States seeks to work closely with Russia on strategic issues of common interest and to manage issues on which we have differing interests. 83 Clearly, America seeks stability, mutual collaboration, and partnerships with China and Russia. Direct confrontation between the United States and China or Russia is not likely; however, involvement of either of these major powers in a regional confrontation, such as the recent Georgian confrontation, remains a legitimate possibility.
A regional confrontation with China may very well involve Taiwan. Taiwan has emerged as a global supplier of information technology and computer components. Dell and Hewlett-Packard spend billions of dollars on computer parts manufactured in Taiwan. 84 Taiwan is currently the largest manufacturer of computer components, and some call it "a hidden center of the global economy," acting as a go-between for American computer makers and Chinese assembly plants. 85 Similar too many American reports of domestic computer attacks originating in China, Taiwanese government computers are attacked approximately 99 percent of the time from IP addresses in China. 86 Any cyber-scenario involving a Chinese regional conflict with Taiwan would more than likely mirror Estonia or Georgia, where China would seek to degrade cyber infrastructure, command and control networks, and possibly financial or media cyber capabilities in a preemptive first strike assault. However, current Chinese strategy does look to downplay its capabilities and avoid confrontation over Taiwan. 87 Nevertheless, the stakes are high when it comes to China's position on Taiwan, while the lack of attribution associated with a Chinese initiated cyber-attack make cyber deterrence of a regional power like China difficult.
Given this type of scenario, and the low probability of direct confrontation between China and the United States, cyber deterrent options should focus on engagement with regional partners through diplomatic and financial channels with the goal of integrating China into the international community.
Diplomatic and Economic Engagement as a Cyber Deterrent Option
The United States engagement policy towards China seeks to avoid conflict. Deterrence should not be the defining criterion to United States-China relations. Continued efforts that provide China incentives to maintain good relations with the United States are the best course of action. Therefore, any cyber deterrence option requires careful analysis so as not to disrupt United States-China relations.
Chinese leaders are concerned with regional security issues. They seek to maintain stability along Chinese borders while advancing strategic economic and political interests throughout Asia. 88 China perceives an independent Taiwan as a threat to Chinese legitimacy of such magnitude that moves in such a direction could result in the over-throw of China's leaders. 89 Taiwan's strength comes from its economic influence and ties with the United States.
Taiwan's gross domestic product is larger than any member of the Association of Southern Asian Nations (ASEAN). 90 The Terrorism facilitated the exchange of information and ideas concerning the rise of cyber terrorism in the region. Topics discussed covered a range of cyber issues to include "Cooperation on Cyber Security within the ARF." Unfortunately, the ARF is not a collective defense organization, nor does it provide a mechanism for collective security. The ARF tends to facilitate dialog among member states to enhance confidence across the ARF while focusing on preventive diplomacy rather than deterrence. 93 The ARF does offer a mechanism to resolve disagreements in order to avoid conflict. It also offers a starting point from which the United
States may engage Southeast Asian countries on the subject of collective cyber defense.
When considering some future possibility of China launching a parallel physical and cyber-attack in a regional confrontation, the United States must be concerned with increased outsourcing of commercial software by American firms to foreign countries. Some argue "offshore outsourcing" is the most serious threat to the United States software industry." 94 This raises the question of possible imbedded vulnerabilities in both hardware and software developed by foreign information technology manufactures. Oracle, a major supplier to American intelligence agencies, has in the past, outsourced software development projects to China. 95 This issue does offer some minimal deterrence options from an economic engagement position.
Future trade agreements and contracts should consider standards that ensure computer security for new systems and provide methods to ensure certification. Contracts must ensure physical security of manufacturing areas and assembly areas. Formal agreements should also provide for on-site monitoring of plants. Considering the significant global concern for secure computing, this should be a feasible task in any future trade agreements or contracts involving ASEAN countries or firms.
Cyber Defense, More than Passwords
At the heart of deterrence lies credibility. With the lack of adequate attribution in the cyber domain, regular demonstration of cyber defense capabilities could be a convincing deterrent. Instead, this lack of resiliency does little to deter future malware attacks, and instead sends a signal the United States military is unprepared for a cyber-attack. Much more is required to deter the types of attacks seen in Estonia and Georgia. In order for the United States to present at least a modicum of credibility in its attempt to secure cyberspace, it must look at renewed emphasis on information assurance (IA), support for strong authentication to critical infrastructure, and investment in secure cyber infrastructure.
Private industry and the DOD both advocate a strong defense in depth strategy for IA.
United States military guidance requires a robust defense in depth strategy to anticipate and preempt adversary cyber-attacks while minimizing effects, reconstituting the network, and preventing reoccurrence. 97 Simply stated, defense in depth employs layered barriers between an attacker and critical information systems. However, it is important to note this strategy is a process, not a technical solution. Therefore, it should employ a protect, detect, and react paradigm. 98 Well-configured firewalls offer one method of protecting critical information systems.
Firewall configuration must only allow port and protocol traffic necessary for mission accomplishment. The firewall rule set must be fully documented, and reviewed on a routine basis for necessity. 99 However, firewall management is far from trivial, and requires highly trained and skilled IA professionals. Equally important is network monitoring to detect intrusions. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) provide the preferred method for network monitoring. Pre-defined rules and attack "signatures" allow the IDS to monitor network traffic for abnormal activities and then execute pre-determined instructions.
100
Perhaps the most important aspect of a defense in depth strategy is security policy and training to enable the proper reaction by personnel. In the DOD, this is particularly important when dealing with the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) compares the SIPRNET to candy, a hard outer shell with a soft center. 101 The physical security around the SIPRNET and its infrastructure is sound, but if the boundary is breached this could lead to a breach of the network. surveyed federal agencies to determine their cyber research and development priorities. The one item consistently identified as a top funding priority for cyber security was authentication. 103 The DOD currently uses smart cards with public key infrastructure (PKI) technology as a means to access the NIPRNET. PKI technology provides multiple security capabilities to include assured electronic transactions, digital signatures, and encrypted unclassified messages.
Intrusion into DOD networks has dropped by over 50 percent following the deployment of Common Access Cards (CAC). 104 Usage of stronger authentication such as PKI and FIPS-201 compliant smart cards for access to critical infrastructure like SCADA or SIPRNET could significantly deter future intrusion attempts by experienced attackers. However, key to smart card success has been PKI, which is reliant upon investment in an infrastructure built to provide third party issuance of trusted certificates.
A strong cyber investment strategy must focus upon secure protocols and infrastructure.
Federal acquisition efforts should lead the way in acquiring secure products by focusing cyber efforts on secure Internet protocols. Many Internet Relay Chat (IRC) tools transmit passwords unencrypted across networks. The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) exchanges both data and login information unencrypted. FTP is one of the most widely used protocols for Internet file transfer, and commonly seen in both federal government and military computer systems. Cyber investment must move beyond quarterly purchases of computers loaded with the latest Microsoft operating system towards a strategy focused on network security in the design process, rather than simply assuming physical security during systems deployment. Only then will the deterrent value of demonstrated cyber security and investment prevail.
The ability to mount a credible cyber defense against potential cyber-attackers can be in itself a plausible cyber deterrent. The United States government and the DOD have displayed limited success in preventing cyber-attacks. What is required to deter nation-state competitors from continuing routine probes and attacks upon the DOD and United States cyber infrastructure is a renewed emphasis on IA, network authentication, and investment in a secure cyber infrastructure.
Chapter 5 Conclusion
Traditional Cold War deterrence models will not work in the cyber domain. The threat of cyber-attack is a new paradigm that is potentially dangerous in new and different ways to the global cyber infrastructure. A lack of attribution makes deterrence in this environment difficult and highly unlikely. A new way of looking at deterrence in the cyber domain is required.
The Internet provides an asymmetrical battlefield comparable to what terrorists enjoy in the physical world, the ability to choose the time and place for attack based on exploitation of a few vulnerabilities. 105 Unlike terrorists, nation-states like China have different strategic goals and therefore each require different strategies and options for deterrence.
Terrorists use the cyber domain for propaganda, resources, and operational communications. Even if attribution existed in the cyber domain, this may not deter extremist organizations as many times terrorist groups seek to affirm their responsibility for terror attacks to gain benefits from the associated propaganda. What may deter terrorist's cyber domain usage and ultimately dissuade their extremist actions is the perception that they will be unable to accomplish their goals. Regional based strategic communications coordinated across the federal government and focused on host-nation success stories is a sound starting point.
A coordinated effort that integrates both diplomatic and military instruments of power is Although these options may be difficult to implement, the United States cannot rely on traditional Cold War deterrence methods in the cyber domain. Deterrence in a multi-polar world must incorporate new thinking and threat based analysis to have any chance of success.
